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Abstract 
Why is it that some governments recognize only one language while others espouse multilingualism? Related, 
why are some governments able to shift language policies, and if there is a shift, what explains the direction? In 
this article, the authors argue that these choices are the product of coalitional constraints facing the government 
during critical junctures in history. During times of political change in the state-building process, the effective 
threat of an alternate linguistic group determines the emergent language policy. If the threat is low, the 
government moves toward monolingual policies. As the threat increases, however, the government is forced to 
co-opt the alternate linguistic group by shifting the policy toward a greater degree of multilingualism. The authors 
test this argument by examining the language policies for government services and the education system in three 
Southeast Asian countries (Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand). 
 
 
Language is “the bearer of a distinctive history, a cultural sensibility, a literature, a mythology, a musical past.”1 It 
is a “bond . . . perhaps the strongest and most lasting that can unite men.”2 And not only does it glue a community 
together from the inside, it also marks the identity of the group from the outside. For many ethnic groups, 
language is “not just a marker, it is the marker: It determines who is and is not a member of the group, and what 
the boundaries of the group are.”3 As languages bond and identify groups, and as countries are often an 
aggregation of several of these groups, language policy choices—which language to use in government services 
and in the education system—are highly political. 
In Malaysia, for instance, the government has long acknowledged the importance of language and the 
implications of its policy choices. This was especially evident during two critical periods in Malaysian history. 
First, after securing independence from Britain (1957), the government recognized multiple languages. Malay and 
English were both designated official languages of government services. Likewise, in the education system, four 
languages (Malay, Chinese, Tamil, and English) were used as mediums of instruction. 
 
* This article originally circulated under the title, “Language Regimes and State-Building in Southeast Asia.” For their helpful comments 
and often much needed advice, we thank Andrew Bennett, David S. Brown, Michael Buehler, David Collier, Rick Doner, Stephan 
Haggard, Joel Moore, James Ockey, Charles Ragin, Jason Seawright, and Dan Slater. We also thank the participants at the Southeast Asian 
Student Initiative at the Weatherhead East Asian Institute at Columbia University and the Pizza and Politics working group at Emory 
University. We are particularly grateful to the three anonymous World Politics reviewers for their comments and guidance. The usual 
caveat applies. 
                                                          
1 Scott 1998, 72. 
2 Tocqueville [1835] 2002, 29. 
3 Brown and Ganguly 2003, 3, italics in original. 
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However, after a period of suspended democracy (1971), Prime Minister Abdul Razak spearheaded an aggressive 
shift in language policy toward monolingualism. English was effectively removed and replaced by Malay. And 
while the Chinese and Tamil schools remained intact, the curriculum was substantially restructured to ensure the 
dominance of Malay in the classroom. These changes were subsequently followed by an amendment to the 
Sedition Act: questioning the government’s decision on this subject matter was prohibited. Why did the 
Malaysian government endorse extensive multilingualism in 1957, only to shift the policy in the opposite 
direction fourteen years later? 
 
Such questions are not unique to Malaysia. Almost every government must at one time or another face the choice 
of developing a language policy. Why do some governments recognize only one language whereas others espouse 
multilingualism? Related, why are some governments able to shift language policies; and if there is a shift, what 
explains the direction? We identify three distinct explanations for language policy choice. First, language policies 
are symptoms of ethnic relations.4 Second, they are legacies of colonialism.5 Third, they are 
instruments for nation-building.6 But we contend that none of these three addresses the observed empirical reality 
of language policy. Language policies are not static; rather, they shift and are shaped over time. As such, the story 
behind language policy choices and their subsequent shifts—if there is a shift—must also be dynamic. 
 
We argue that language policy, rather than resulting from ethnic group competition, emerges from the coalitional 
composition of governments during critical junctures in state development. During these moments in state-
building, the linguistic groups that have access to 
government power and are able to organize for political purposes determine the language policy of the state. The 
government prefers monolingual policies, but if an alternate linguistic group is able to mount an effective threat to 
the government’s survival, the latter will co-opt the former. The result of such coalition politics is the adoption of 
multilingual policies. As such, a government’s language policy does not necessarily reflect a majority ethnic 
group imposing its will on minority groups. In fact, as we will demonstrate, minority groups have been able 
to extract linguistic concessions. 
 
The article proceeds as follows. We begin by highlighting the limitations of the current literature to explain 
language policy choices and by calling attention to the need to consider coalitional constraints facing the 
government during critical junctures in history. We then present our research design, which includes the two 
observations from the Malaysian case mentioned above along with four additional observations (Singapore 1959, 
Singapore 1965, Thailand 1902, and Thailand 1938). This is followed by an empirical test on the effects of 
alternate linguistic group threat on language policy choices. We conclude and discuss implications in the final 
section. 
 
 
Monolingualism and Multilingualism 
Three distinct arguments exist in the current literature. First, language policy is a symptom of ethnic relations. 
Present-day rivalries between people of different cultures arise from primordial hatred. Since these rivalries are 
deeply rooted, groups seek to impose their dominance when the opportunity arises, including in the realm of 
language policy.7  There are, however, two limitations with this explanation. Theoretically, it ignores how group 
elites mobilize and create ethnic identities through the manipulation of symbols, including language.8 The 
development of the Thai language is a good example. Prior to the twentieth century, only about 15 percent of the 
population called themselves “Thai” and spoke the language now recognized as (central or standard) “Thai” in the 
                                                          
4 Geertz 1994; Simpson 2007. 
5 PuruShotam 1998; Tarling 2004 
6 Brown 2009; R. Ganguly 2003; Š. Ganguly 2003. 
7 Geertz 1994. 
8 Smith 2000. 
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region.9 Yet after a century of language policy implementation, the Thai-ness of the population is almost 
unquestioned.10  Simply put, ethnicity is malleable. 
 
Second, an ethnicity-based argument also fails to explain events in Malaysia. As illustrated in Table 1, the ethnic 
distribution remained largely unchanged from independence until 1971. The country was split between the 
majority Malays, the Chinese, who made up one-quarter of the population, Tamil Indians, and a smattering of 
other ethnic groups. Ethnologue estimated the Greenberg index at 0.599, meaning that the probability any two 
people drawn at random from the Malaysian population would have different mother tongues was approximately 
60 percent.11 By 1971, despite the merger of Sabah and Sarawak, ethnic relations remained the same. Tensions 
still ran high between the Malays and the Chinese, and ethnic fractionalization remained high. Yet policy 
changed. In short, since ethnic composition was static, it alone cannot explain the change in language policies 
between 1957 and 1971. 
 
 
 
Another explanation is that language policy is the legacy of colonialism. Two mechanisms link colonialism to 
language policy. The first is a path dependence explanation. Colonialism classified people into sometimes 
artificially determined ethnic groups; and based on these 
                                                          
9 Keyes 2003. 
10 Consider, for example, that the CIA Factbook declares the vast majority of Thailand’s inhabitants as “Thai.” In contrast, 
Grabowsky argues that about 80 percent of inhabitants of the Northeast—the most heavily populated region—are ethnically 
Lao rather than Thai. Grabowsky’s estimate would put the number of ethnically Lao inhabitants at about one-third of the total 
population. See Grabowsky 1995. 
11 Grimes 1978. 
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classifications, some languages were recognized and some were denied. This artificial construct remained as 
language policy until today.12 The other mechanism is about substitution. Anticolonial sentiments evoked 
widespread demands to end the use of the colonial language. This removal, in turn, necessitated an indigenous 
language to replace the colonial language in government services.13 In the Malaysian case, there is prima facie 
evidence that path dependence accounted for the choice in 1957 and that substitution mattered in 1971. However, 
as is evident from Table 1, colonial legacies—like ethnic relations—are also static. It cannot explain why at one 
moment (that is, 1957) its effect would be path dependent but at another moment (that is, 1971) its effect would 
be substitution. This begs the question: what changed? 
 
The third explanation is that language policy served as an instrument for nation-building. With independence, 
political elites believed that a coherent national identity was necessary for the effective functioning of political 
institutions.14 In response to this need, governments often used language—a traditional “ethnic” marker—to give 
the modern nation “historical authenticity, and thus legitimacy.”15 In the case of Malaysia, the “vision of ethnic 
nationalism that enshrined Malay privileges”16 was critical in the government’s pursuit of a language policy that 
emphasized Malay. In this account, language policy is less a reflection of ethnic composition than a tool that 
political leaders can use to create national identity.17 
 
While language is an integral component of nation-building, this account is inadequate in at least two ways. First, 
it does not explain the choice of a language policy. Why is one language chosen at the expense of another for 
nation-building? The language chosen is too often taken as a given. And when efforts are made to explain the 
choice, the reasoning is often ex post or functional in character. Second, these explanations cannot explain why 
governments adopt different linguistic strategies for nation-building. Again, as illustrated in Table 1, in the 
Malaysian case, the “vision of ethnic nationalism that enshrined Malay privileges” was always present. In fact, in 
the negotiations leading up to independence (1957), the Malays fought for the constitutional recognition of their 
special status and their right to “first claim to the country.” Yet, while this “first claim to the country” never 
changed, language policies did. Nation-building explanations, in sum, cannot account for these changes. 
 
Consistent across all three arguments is a failure to consider the government and the constraints facing it. 
Governments do not choose language policies in a political or historical vacuum. The ability of a government to 
shift policies in any direction depends on the composition of its governing coalition. Within the coalition, the 
strength of constituent groups relative to the strength of the state also matters. We argue that if an alternate 
linguistic group is able to effectively threaten the government’s tenure—as identified by clear leadership, large 
membership, and/or financial resources—the government must co-opt the group. This co-optation unfolds through 
some institutionalized channel18 whereby the government incorporates the group into a ruling coalition. Under 
such conditions, when an alternate linguistic group is part of the government coalition, language policies shift 
toward a greater degree of multilingualism—if there is room for such a shift. If the policy is already complete 
multilingualism, we should observe no shift (status quo). The case of Malaysia in 1957 is an example of how 
alternate linguistic groups (Chinese and Indian) were able to threaten 
the government. 
 
In contrast, if the coalitional constraint is absent, the government can shift policies toward monolingualism. 
Again, this shift is possible only if there is room for this directional change. If the language policy was already 
complete monolingualism, the status quo prevails. Note that the coalitional constraint can be absent in two ways. 
                                                          
12 PuruShotam 1998; see also Hirschman 1987. 
13 Mohr 1984; Montolalu and Suryadinata 2007. 
14 R. Ganguly 2003. 
15 Brown 2009. 
16 S. Ganguly 2003, 237. 
17 See Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm 1990; Rappa and Wee 2006. 
18 Gandhi 2008. 
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One is if the alternate linguistic group exists outside the ruling coalition. There are no institutionalized channels 
for the group to express its demands. Alternatively, the linguistic group can be a member of the ruling coalition 
but lacks the ability to threaten the regime’s survival; that is, it does not have the relative strength to force policy 
concessions from the government. This latter scenario was the case in Malaysia in 1971. Although the ruling 
coalition included several alternate linguistic groups, 
these groups were unable to constrain the government from shifting the policy toward monolingualism.  
 
Put simply, coalitional constraints matter; indeed, their effects on policy choices are well documented.19 Building 
on this literature and expanding it to include language policy choices, we argue that language policy choice is the 
product of constraints facing the government 
during critical junctures in history. When there are macrochanges to the political system, the channels through 
which alternate linguistic groups demand recognition also change. Transitions from colonialism to independence, 
from authoritarianism to democracy, and from absolute monarchy to limited rule can—but does not always—
incorporate previously marginalized groups into the political sphere. But not all regime changes benefit such 
groups. A transition toward authoritarianism, for instance, can effectively mute the alternate linguistic group. 
Without a voice, its calls for linguistic recognition fall on deaf ears when the government is choosing a new 
language policy.20 
 
During these critical junctures in state-building, the salience of language policies increases exponentially. 
Language policies are especially important at these moments because national identity depends on language.21 As 
David Laitin noted in his comparative analysis of identity 
formation in four post-Soviet states, “national projects have usually involved the reinsertion of a folk language as 
part of the core identity of people who are descendents of speakers of that language. . . . Language movements, 
with the goal of restoring languages in desuetude as a tool 
to create modern nations, have been a constant source of identity politics in the modern age.”22 
 
When an alternate linguistic group demands recognition of its language during the state-building period, the 
government can respond in several ways. First, it can thwart the rebellion and repress. Although commonly used, 
the tool of repression is neither cheap nor always effective.23 Alternatively, the government can make 
concessions. One type of concession is to distribute rents: perks, privileges, and spoils.24 But these monetary 
concessions, employment opportunities, and social benefits are sometimes not sufficient for inducing cooperation. 
The second type of concession is to make policy compromises. When the policy demands are linguistic in nature, 
compromises entail the recognition of additional languages. The government, despite a strong preference for a 
single language, must accommodate the alternate language in government services and/or the education 
curriculum. 
 
Whether the outcome is monolingualism or multilingualism depends on how great the threat of the alternate 
linguistic group is in relation to the strength of the state. Such a group is a threat when it is well organized to a 
degree that it can mount a credible challenge to the government—either through violent protests or exiting the 
state—and is a member of the ruling coalition. By contrast, when the effective threat of the alternate linguistic 
group is low, the government can choose policies with few concerns about its tenure. The subsequent outcome is 
                                                          
19 See Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Campos and Root 1996; Doner, Ritchie, and Slater 2005; MacIntyre 2001; Pepinsky 
2009; Waldner 1999. 
20 Brown and Liu show that authoritarian regimes are generally associated with less minority language recognition. However, 
under certain conditions democracies can have a negative effect: when the largest linguistic group constitutes more than 50 
percent of the population, there is a risk of a tyranny of the majority. See Brown and Liu 2011. 
21 Anderson 1983. 
22 Laitin 1998, 24–25. 
23 Acemoglu and Robinson 2005; Boix 2003; Wintrobe 1998. 
24 See Migdal 2001. 
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a policy shift toward a greater degree of monolingualism. It is therefore important to recognize that if the previous 
policy was already complete monolingualism, there is no shift. This lack of a shift is not because coalitional 
constraint did not factor into the government’s calculation. Rather, the policy space is bounded and the 
government cannot become more monolingual than complete monolingualism. Put differently, if the status quo 
were not complete monolingualism, we would observe a language policy shift. 
 
But what happens if the alternate linguistic group poses a high effective threat? Under such conditions, the denial 
of linguistic recognition can undermine state-building efforts. As a result, the government is constrained to co-opt 
the alternate linguistic group. The extent of concession can vary. At one extreme, the policy can be simply 
“throwing a bone.” For instance, the alternate language is recognized as a medium of instruction, but only at the 
primary level. Specifically, the general curriculum and the medium of instruction at the secondary level remain 
dominated by the majority language. At the other extreme, by contrast, the policy can recognize equality of the 
two languages. For instance, both languages are acceptable mediums of government services. Likewise, the two 
languages run parallel in the education curriculum. Examples of such concessions include language arrangements 
in Canada and Switzerland. We argue that as the effective threat of the alternate linguistic group increases, we are 
also more likely to see increases in linguistic concession. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates this argument. Note that with our argument, the effective threat of the alternate linguistic 
group is a shared antecedent condition for language policy choices. Put differently, we expect that the presence of 
a strong group vis-à-vis the state will be a virtually sufficient condition for the adoption of multilingualism. This 
by no means precludes other possible antecedent conditions.25 There are other possible situations in which a 
government may adopt either monolingualism or multilingualism. In the next section, we discuss the research 
design. 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
25 Ragin 2008. 
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Research Design 
We test the above arguments across six observations: cross-nationally across three Southeast Asian countries and 
over time in each of the three: Singapore (1959 and 1965); Malaysia (1957 and 1971); and Thailand (1902 and 
1938). While evidence from a rigorous comparison of six observations cannot test the theory as a general 
proposition for every language policy choice in every country, it does establish that alternate linguistic group 
threats matter for language policy choices. 
 
The six causal-process observations26 drawn from our three countries provide broad variation in language policy 
shifts. First, in Singapore 1959, the language policy shifted from colonial incomplete multilingualism to complete 
multilingualism. The status quo prevailed after the separation from Malaysia in 1965. Second, in Malaysia 1957, 
the language policy represented a smaller shift than Singapore’s toward multilingualism. But this multilingualism 
would be short-lived. In 1971, following a transition in leadership, language policy shifted drastically toward 
Malay-dominant incomplete monolingualism. And finally, during state-building efforts in Thailand in the early 
1900s and shortly thereafter, the government replaced the previously incomplete multilingual policy in the region 
with monolingualism. This choice was continued and reinforced (no shift) in 1938 after the transition from 
absolute monarchy. Figure 2 highlights the direction of these changes.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
26 See Collier, Seawright, and Munck 2004. 
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From a theoretical standpoint, these three countries lend themselves naturally to a most similar design.27 Recall 
that we identified three distinct explanations in the literature review. One focused on ethnic relations. The three 
countries exhibit comparable levels of ethnic fractionalization.28 Although Malaysia and Thailand are both 
indigenously more heterogeneous than Singapore, all three countries experienced religious expansion from the 
Middle East and India, commodity traders from Europe, and movement of laborers from China and India. 
Encouraged in part by the British, the Chinese immigrants came to Southeast Asia in two major waves. The first 
wave (late fifteenth–sixteenth century) was characterized by Chinese men who traveled from Fujian province, 
spoke Hokkien, and married local women.29 By contrast, the Chinese in the second wave (late nineteenth–early 
twentieth century) came from a variety of provinces in China, where the dialects spoken were other than 
Hokkien.30 At the same time, the British brought a large number of Tamil-speaking Indians to work in the tin 
mines and rubber plantations in the Thai-Malay Peninsula.31 The similarity across these three cases fails to 
provide an explanation for the variation in language policy choices. 
 
Another explanation is the legacy of colonialism. Britain was a major influence in all three countries. The British 
arrived in the 1800s and settled in Penang (in present-day Malaysia). They then colonized Singapore, and it was 
not long before the British replaced the Dutch in Malacca (also in present-day Malaysia). Although Thailand 
remained free of a colonial overlord, it was not free of colonial influence. In fact, it “behaved like [a colony] in 
many respects.”32 Thailand was forced to accept unequal trade treaties (with the British and French) and cede 
land to colonialists. The state also patterned itself to a degree after the British administrative structure observed in 
nearby lands.33 Given the extent of the British influence in all three countries, variation in colonial legacy cannot 
account for the variation in language policies either cross-nationally or over time. 
 
Because of the “Logic of Agreement,” many factors (for example, demographics,34 culture, and colonial 
influences)—lacking even basic correlation—can be eliminated as potential necessary conditions. The six 
observations, though, exhibit variation in the effective threat of alternate linguistic groups—our causal variable. 
The variation in outcomes observed across the three cases provides a distinct advantage in advancing our 
theoretical expectations. Before turning to the empirical evidence, we first discuss how we identify our units of 
analysis: critical junctures in state-building. We then explain how we operationalize and measure effective threat 
of the alternate linguistic group and language policy choice. 
 
 
Critical Junctures 
A critical juncture is characterized by macrochanges to the political system, sometimes coinciding with a regime 
change.35 It is more than a new head of state, which is neither necessary nor sufficient; rather, there must be new 
                                                          
27 George and Bennett 2005. 
28 Singapore: previously 0.591 and presently 0.773; Malaysia: previously 0.599 and presently 0.747; and Thailand: previously 
0.634 and presently 0.740. See Grimes 1978; Grimes 1984; Lewis 2009. 
29 Skinner 1958. 
30 Skinner 1963. 
31 Osborne 1997. 
32 Tarling 2004, 59. 
33 Wyatt 2003. 
34 Admittedly, these three cases do exhibit some variation in religious demography, but we chose not to focus on religion, for 
two reasons, one theoretical and one empirical. First, in Singapore and Malaysia, religious and linguistic cleavages 
overlapped to some extent (for example, Malay speakers were largely Muslims); in contrast, in Thailand, Buddhism was 
shared across language groups. It is possible that this difference made any attempt by Singapore’s and Malaysia’s 
governments to move toward monolingualism more difficult than Thailand’s. Yet Malaysia’s move toward monolingualism 
still occurred despite this overlap—but not until the second period. Second, there is evidence that religious heterogeneity and 
linguistic heterogeneity can have different effects. See Alesina et al. 2003; Boix 2003. Given the empirics and the lack of a 
good theory to link religious demographics to language policies, we felt it was best not to take religion into consideration. 
35 Collier and Collier 1991. 
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institutions. Moreover, the processes for voicing preferences and how conflict is adjudicated have also changed. 
Examples of such critical junctures include transitions between authoritarianism and democracy; between 
colonialism and independence; and between absolutism and limited rule. 
 
Critical junctures are vital to the argument because language policy suffers from path dependence: once a country 
sets down one trajectory, change is possible only during transitional moments.36 Even when change is possible, 
however, there is still a strong preference to reinforce the status quo because change can be very costly. The costs 
include—but are not limited to—forcing large portions of the population to learn a new language; developing new 
textbooks and training educators; and standardizing vocabulary and grammar. Failure to pay these costs can 
marginalize a large segment of the population. Yet, despite these costs, shifts still occur. In short, we identify a 
critical juncture as a macrochange in the state wherein language policy choice becomes relevant and possible. 
 
 
Effective Threat 
The effective threat of an alternate linguistic group is measured relative to the strength of the state. The strength of 
the state is determined by its bureaucratic capacity, which emerges from its “systemic vulnerability.”37 We focus 
on the financial resources available to the government. The ability of a government to repress or buy off the 
opposition depends on what is available in the coffers. We also look at the security threats facing the state. These 
threats can be both international and domestic. With state strength measured, we then turn to the alternate 
linguistic group. The effective threat of an alternate linguistic group is considered high when it is a member of the 
ruling coalition and effectively organized such that it can protest en masse, incite violence, demand secession, 
and/or initiate civil war. Organization is identified by clear leadership, large membership, and/or financial 
resources. The capacity for threat is measured by examining past group behavior, foreign support, at-large 
resources to divide, and an ideological distinctiveness. Effective threat is coded as high or low. 
 
 
Language Policy Choice 
We assess two arenas, as identified by sociolinguist Joshua Fishman,38 where the choice of language recognition 
is especially pronounced. The first arena is government services. To code for government services, we look at the 
languages used in legislative debates, judicial proceedings, and bureaucracy administration. The second arena is 
the education system. We focus on the laws governing language use in the public primary and secondary schools. 
We code specifically for which languages are used as mediums of instructions and the extent (that is, the number 
of years) of this use. Note that a language—any language—is not considered a medium of instruction if it is 
taught only as a subject. Rather, it must be used to teach the nonlanguage classes (for example, history, math, and 
sciences).39 
 
Language policy choice is coded along a four-point ordinal scale (complete monolingualism, incomplete 
monolingualism, incomplete multilingualism, and complete multilingualism). The direction of the shift is 
measured by examining how many languages were recognized in government services and education curriculum 
under the status quo as compared with the new policy. Shift is considered toward monolingualism 
(multilingualism) if more (fewer) languages were recognized under the status quo policy. Table 2 summarizes the 
values for the variables of interest across all six observations. 
 
                                                          
36 Mahoney 2000. 
37 Doner, Ritchie, and Slater 2005. 
38 Fishman 1989. 
39 Fishman also identified a third arena: mass media. We do not include the media in our analysis for two reasons. First, two 
of the observations (Thailand 1902 and 1938) occurred prior to the expansion of radio and television news programs. Second, 
although the Thai government did severely restrict the use of Chinese language newspapers in the second period, there is 
little variation among our other observations. Alternate language media were severely restricted in all our observations. 
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Singapore 
After World War II the British returned to Singapore with the first election set for 1959. Prior to the first election, 
a group of English-educated men, led by Lee Kuan Yew, formed the People’s Action Party (PAP). The English 
speakers knew from the outset that electoral victory and complete independence would be impossible without the 
coalitional support of the Chinese population in Singapore. The Chinese were a majority of the population, and 
many of them were communist sympathizers. Although the PAP was ideologically leftist, the party was 
fundamentally anticommunist. 
 
The Chinese were led by the hugely popular Lim Chin Siong. Aside from commanding a sizable part of the 
island’s population, the group had access to financial resources. There were several independently wealthy 
communist supporters—both domestically and abroad—who offered monetary support. Moreover, the threat of 
the communists to protest en masse and incite violence was absolutely credible. In 1955, for instance, workers 
from the Hock Lee bus company, urged on by Lim Chin Siong, went on strike to protest the poor working 
conditions. When the police attempted to break up the two thousand–person mass demonstration, riots broke 
out.40 Similarly, in 1956, the government deregistered, dissolved, and banned three procommunist organizations, 
including the Singapore Chinese Middle School Students Union. In protest, students camped out at two different 
schools and demonstrated for two weeks. When the government’s ultimatum for the schools to be vacated went 
unanswered, riots again broke out across the island.41 
                                                          
40 Lee 1998. 
41 Lee 1998. 
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Despite the many differences—linguistic and ideological—between Lee Kuan Yew and Lim Chin Siong, the 
former was fully aware that he needed the latter’s electoral support. Without the cooperation of the Chinese, 
complete independence would not be possible. As a result, Lee Kuan Yew’s PAP courted the Chinese 
aggressively. Despite the coalition, however, the relationship was by all accounts hostile. Both groups viewed 
each other with suspicion. Lee Kuan Yew recounted that from the beginning, the Chinese were an “albatross 
around the necks.”42 In fact, in his first speech as prime minister after the PAP won the 1959 election, Lee Kuan 
Yew warned, “[I]f we fail, brute force returns.”43 During this period the effective threat of the Chinese was 
absolutely high and the strength of the state relatively weak. Despite co-opting the Chinese into a ruling coalition, 
the PAP recognized that the arrangement was precarious at best. In response, the PAP presented itself as a 
multiracial party and co-opted the other alternate linguistic groups that on their own were of low effective threat 
but vis-à-vis the state relatively strong: Malays and Tamils. 
 
What were the implications of these constraints on language policy choices? In Singapore, the status quo from 
colonial times was the use of English in government services. In addition to English, three other languages were 
also used as mediums of instruction (Chinese, Malay, and Tamil). However, this was true only at the primary 
level. English was the exclusive language of secondary education. Constrained by all the different alternate 
linguistic groups, the English-speaking government responded by shifting language policies toward complete 
multilingualism. At the end of the day, all four languages—English, Chinese, Malay, and Tamil—were 
constitutionally designated as official languages of the government. 
 
The education system witnessed a similar development, although the changes proved quite contentious. Given the 
fragmented system inherited from the British, the PAP believed it was “political[ly] imperative [and urgent] to 
create an indigenous and integrated national school system united by a common language policy.”44 As a result, 
all four languages were recognized as mediums of instruction across both the primary and the secondary 
curriculums. This, however, necessitated standardization. The Chinese curriculum was restructured from a 
total of twelve years to ten to match that of the English schools,45 and the Malay curriculum was expanded with 
the development of Malay secondary schools.46 
 
Although it was “the only politically defendable policy,”47 the multilingual policy served two purposes with 
regard to the relevant alternate linguistic groups. First, it denied the communist Chinese the opportunity to label 
Lee Kuan Yew and his English-educated colleagues as “enemy and destroyer of Chinese culture.”48 The Chinese 
community saw the Chinese schools as a necessary vehicle for carrying on classical Chinese scholarship. 
Furthermore, these schools were a traditional breeding ground for communism. Second, the multilingual policy 
afforded the PAP an opportunity to signal to the Malayan Malays its willingness to recognize the status of the 
Malay language as the “first among equals.” This recognition was necessary for the successful merger with 
Malaya to create Malaysia—a policy Lee Kuan Yew advocated. As a result, the PAP spent considerable energy 
developing an Institute of Malayan Culture for popularizing and synthesizing the Malayan culture;49 promoting a 
Malay language awareness week;50 and legislating the compulsory study of Malay in all schools.51 
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The story of Singapore’s language policy choice during this premerger period matches theoretical expectations: 
when the effective threat of alternate linguistic groups is high, linguistic policies shift toward multilingualism. 
In this case, the English-educated chose multilingualism as a concession to everyone (Chinese, Indians, and 
Malays). What is noteworthy is that despite inheriting a multilingual status quo from colonial times, there was the 
strategic response by the government to shift the policy further along toward complete multilingualism. Multiple 
languages would be recognized as official languages of the state and as mediums of instruction at both the 
primary and the secondary levels.  
 
But perhaps equally interesting is what happened to this complete multilingual policy in the post-merger period. 
In 1965 Singapore was expelled from the Malaysian Federation. Although 1959 was the first election under 
“three-fourths” independence, 1965 was the first year that Singapore was left to govern its own affairs completely. 
While the Lee Kuan Yew–led PAP still remained in power, the mechanism through which the Chinese and 
Malays constrained the government had changed. 
 
The ex ante expectations would have predicted a shift toward monolingualism. Yet despite this absolute 
weakening of the threat posed by the alternate linguistic groups, there was no shift in language policy: the 
complete multilingual policy from the premerger period remained unchanged. We argue this is because the 
relative effective threat of the minorities was still high during a time of political crisis. At first glance, the 
communist Chinese could still protest en masse—and in fact, they did. There were a number of demonstrations 
and vehicular hit-and-runs. The most sizable demonstration took place on May Day 1967, when five hundred 
protestors took to the streets and clashed with the police. Numerous injuries were recorded and forty-six rioters 
were arrested.52 There was also a concern about the Malays. In addition to escalating racial tensions between the 
Chinese and the Malays (which included riots spilling over from Malaysia), there were questions about Malay 
allegiance in the event of a conflict with Malaysia. Simply put, “the pressures following separation were relentless 
[and] there was never a dull moment in [Singapore’s] relations with Malaysia.”53 
 
But the high effective threat of the alternate linguistic groups during this period had less to do with the groups 
themselves and more to do with the weak state. Recall, effective threat is relative: it is about the strength of the 
group vis-à-vis the state. The Singapore state in the post-merger period was exceptionally weak. Economic 
difficulties (for example, lack of foreign reserves, not enough land to grow rice, and high unemployment) and 
security threats (for example, Malaysia-Singapore tensions and Malaysia-Indonesia war) are evidence of this 
systemic vulnerability.54 
 
All this was reflected in the government’s constant need to discuss “survival.” For instance, the minister for 
foreign affairs, S. Rajaratnam, remarked: “[W]hy we harp on the survival theme . . . is . . . I assure you, not 
political gimmick to rally support for the government. . . . [W]hen we talk of survival, it is not with a view of 
rallying support for a tottering government. . . . We are not thinking about the next elections. We are thinking of 
how Singapore can survive.”55 This precarious situation would increase—from a relative standpoint—the 
effective threats of the communist Chinese and Malays. And as predicted, when there are coalitional constraints, 
governments shift policies toward multilingualism. In this situation, when the status quo was already complete 
multilingualism, we observed no change. 
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Malaysia 
Malaysia’s language policy development can also be identified as having occurred in two periods. In the first 
period, the prime minister (Tunku) and his UMNO-led Alliance Party labored to balance the linguistic interests of 
the Malays, Chinese, and Tamil. In contrast, the second period was characterized by the rule of the UMNO-
dominated National Front. 
 
Like the Singapore case, the British also returned to Malaya in 1945. Shortly thereafter, in 1946, UMNO emerged 
to oppose a specific set of British policies, although more generally it continued to support the British. In fact, it 
cooperated with the colonial authorities to defeat the communist insurgency. Over time, UMNO’s moderate (that 
is, non-anti-imperialist and noncommunist) position elevated the party’s importance when negotiations eventually 
shifted to independence. And while the British were willing to grant independence, UMNO—led by Tunku since 
1951—knew the colonial authorities would suspend negotiations as soon as evidence of racial tensions surfaced. 
As a result, UMNO co-opted two alternate linguistic groups into a larger coalition: the noncommunist Chinese 
and the Indians.  
 
The effective threat of the Chinese was high. They commanded a sizable population (roughly one-quarter of the 
total) and controlled wealth disproportionally greater than their proportion of the population. Around this time, the 
average Chinese income was 2.5 times greater than that of the average Malay’s.56 The noncommunist Chinese 
were represented politically by the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA), which had emerged in 1949 to 
challenge the Malayan Communist Party. Because of the MCA’s ideological position, the Kuomintang 
(nationalist, noncommunist party in China) and the British supported the party. 
 
In the 1952 Kuala Lumpur municipal council elections, UMNO and MCA agreed to avoid contesting the same 
seats. The results were shocking: the UMNO-MCA coalition won nine of the twelve seats, dealing a crushing 
blow to the larger anti-imperialist Malay parties. Given their success, the UMNO-MCA coalition in 1955 formally 
contested the Legislative Council election under the banner of “Alliance Party.” The Alliance Party won all but 
one of the fifty-two seats.  
 
In addition to the Chinese non-communists, the Indians also mattered. While a smaller population than the 
Chinese, the Tamil-speaking Indian minority was still politically significant. The Indians were represented by the 
Malayan Indian Congress (mic). Under the leadership of K. L. Devaser, the mic joined the UMNO-MCA Alliance 
Party. 
 
By the mid-1950s the Alliance Party began arguing for independence. Each member of the coalition knew that 
while the British were willing to grant independence, successful negotiations depended on convincing London of 
the absence of racial tensions. As a result, each member of the coalition could threaten its survival. The three 
parties (UMNO, MCA, and mic) ultimately agreed to the “Bargain,” a contract that included seven arrangements. 
The Bargain proved to be necessary to guarantee not only Malayan independence but also Alliance control in the 
new government. 
 
The linguistic status quo during the colonial period was similar to that of Singapore’s. In government services, 
English was the official language; and in the educational system, English, Malay, Chinese, and Tamil were all 
languages of instruction. But again, like Singapore, this multilingual arrangement existed only at the primary 
level. English was the exclusive language of secondary education. 
 
Given theoretical expectations, we would expect governments constrained by alternate linguistic groups to shift 
policies toward greater levels of multilingualism. This indeed happened. One of the arrangements in the Bargain 
was the recognition of both Malay and English as official languages of the state.57 While MCA wanted Chinese 
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and MIC wanted Tamil to be recognized as well, the costs of a failed Bargain were too large. But perhaps more 
interesting was the continued use of English. Members of UMNO wanted Malay monolingualism. Tunku 
even once remarked, “[A] plural nation . . . must have a national language . . . otherwise independence is 
meaningless.”58 But Tunku also knew that this policy was not possible given the effective threats of MCA and 
mic. The second best option was to allow English to remain on the books as an official language. However, its 
status was only temporary. The agreement provided for the removal of English in ten years (1967). And finally, in 
the educational system, the status quo prevailed: all four languages (English, Malay, Chinese, and Tamil) 
continued to be recognized as mediums of instruction. 
 
The Bargain was clearly important during the transition to independence. It was the result of a majority-led 
government constrained by two alternate linguistic groups of high effective threat. What would have happened if 
this threat had been low? Fortunately, there is a natural counterfactual. In 1971 Malaysia underwent another 
significant political transition. In response to the 1969 riots,59 the government declared a state of emergency and 
suspended democracy. During this time, Deputy Prime Minister Abdul Razak replaced Tunku as the head 
of government. When Parliament reconvened again in 1971, UMNO had a second chance to shift the language 
policy. After all, the ten-year status of English as an official language had already expired in 1967. Incidentally, 
English continued to be used in all official capacities. 
 
While MCA and MIC remained coalition partners in the government, their effective threats had diminished quite 
significantly by this point. This was especially true for the Chinese. The MCA was neither organized 
nor capable of inciting mass protest. Evidence of this included the number of splinter parties that had since 
emerged. Moreover, these new Chinese parties swept all of MCA’s seats in the 1969 election. The implication of 
this is that while the MCA had not been replaced, its influence had significantly diffused. In short, the effective 
threat of MCA—and of the Chinese community at large—was now low. 
 
An indication of changing dynamics was the emergence of a new government. Whereas the Alliance Party had 
been “born out of necessity of the three major races to work together to fulfill the prerequisite set by the British 
for negotiating independence, [t]he National Front, on the other hand, came to life as the savior of a nation on the 
brink of collapse.”60 The UMNO-dominated National Front included not only MCA and mic but also as many as 
ten other parties, all in a vertical hierarchy.61 
 
Given the weakening of MCA and mic, the theory would lead us to expect a shift in language policies toward 
Malay monolingualism. Indeed, this was exactly what happened. The government removed English as an official 
language and recognized Malay as the sole language of government services. Changes in educational policy were 
equally forceful but took place more gradually. The Ministry of Education phased out all English schools and 
simultaneously introduced Malay as the exclusive language of instruction at the secondary level. The shift, 
however, was not toward complete monolingualism. The Ministry did allow Chinese and Tamil primary schools 
to stay open,62 although the Malay language became a compulsory course. In addition, students from these 
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schools were required to attend a one-year Malay-medium transition school before proceeding to the Malay-
language secondary schools where Chinese and Tamil were optional subjects.63 
 
 
Thailand 
Thailand today, at least for many nationals and outsiders, is thought of as a homogenous state—filled with Thais 
who speak standard Thai. Few realize that prior to the implementation of national language policies, only about 
15 percent of the population spoke standard Thai—also known as central Thai.64 The current perception of 
linguistic homogeneity and literacy rates in standard Thai of over 90 percent are testaments to the effectiveness of 
approximately a century of efforts by the Thai state to implement a monolingual language policy.65 While 
Thailand’s language policy may not seem contentious today, its origins provoked resistance. The impetus to 
develop such a policy was based in concerns of elites that a multiethnic state (marked by multiple languages) 
would fall to predation by external forces. 
 
Thailand’s language policy emerged during two major periods of state-building. In the first, the interests of the 
government elite were turned toward negating threats that might emerge from European colonial powers. In the 
second, one of the primary goals was to create a national identity to ensure national security. 
 
The first move toward solidifying a monolingual language policy was taken during the reign of King 
Chulalongkorn (1868–1910). When the absolute monarch ascended to the throne, he found himself in the 
midst of palace politics framed by Western colonial ambitions. The French were pressing on the east banks of the 
Mekong River for more land, while the British had their eyes on natural resource deposits in the North and South 
along with trade concessions. The Siamese palace had little choice but to engage in a series of administrative 
modernization efforts to solidify and establish its control over Siamese territory.66 
 
The administrative reforms, though, were met with resistance by local political and religious leaders in the North, 
Northeast, and South. For instance, in 1902 a rebellion led by “holy men” in the Northeast left the Siamese 
government shaken and concerned that the Northeasterners, whose language and ethnicity were close to that of 
the Laotians under the rule of the French, would ally with the French in their ambitions to assimilate more 
territory into the Indochinese colonies.67 Similar problems in the North and South further spurred the Siamese 
state to establish itself as the sole sovereign force within its new borders.68 
 
One of the major efforts was to focus on the “Thai-ness” of the people. This included promoting standard Thai as 
the medium of instruction throughout the kingdom, an endeavor spearheaded by the half-brothers of King 
Chulalongkorn. They envisioned a national compulsory education system that would replace monastic education, 
previously the main source of training in both rural and urban areas. A 1902 law established this policy. 
 
The linguistic status quo had been an amalgam of languages, such as Khmer, Lao, and others, used as the medium 
of instruction in monastic schools throughout the kingdom. As state schools were expanding in the ensuing years, 
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monastic education, too, reformed to adopt a Thai curriculum. Books in local dialects were destroyed, and monks 
were trained to teach standard Thai. The government banned teaching in other languages. By 1905 the 
government provided a standard Thai grammar for instruction.69 Officials also declared that “only education 
in [central] Thai may be supported by the government.”70 Within a few decades, monastic education was largely 
replaced by state schools teaching in standard Thai. What monastic education remained adopted the central 
government curriculum. 
 
Implementation of a monolingual policy continued throughout the following decade. Beyond concerns that the 
Siamese government had with its native population, the Chinese in Bangkok were also seen as a possible threat. 
After the death of King Chulalongkorn, his son, King Vajiravudh (1910–25), pushed for assimilation of the 
Chinese population in continuation of the monolinguistic policy. He wrote a pamphlet in 1914 calling the Chinese 
the “Jews of the East,” wherein he declared unassimilated Chinese communities a danger to national unity. In 
1918 his government passed a law requiring that private Chinese schools teach standard Thai. That, coupled with 
the 1911 Thai Nationality Act, encouraged further assimilation of the Chinese community.71 
 
The alternate linguistic groups in Thailand were far from able to mount a credible threat to the government. While 
rebellious groups led by religious leaders in the North and Northeast and the Chinese in Bangkok were seen as 
potentially dangerous, neither group had allies in the ruling coalition. Given our theoretical predictions, we should 
observe a complete monolingual outcome. The evidence suggests this was the case. When the palace established 
standard Thai as the sole language of the government and education, it faced little opposition from members of 
the political coalition. The ruling coalition was made up of Thai royals, many of whom were closely related to the 
monarch and shared the same goals of building a modern nation-state free of colonial rule. The biggest threat was 
not the alternate linguistic group per se but the fear that it would ally with external forces. Thus the multilingual 
status quo was abandoned for a monolingual policy. 
 
The status quo (complete monolingualism) continued after the fall of the absolute monarchy in 1932. Following a 
brief civilian-led government, a military dictatorship emerged in 1938. Led by Field Marshall P. 
Phibunsongkhram (Phibun), the government sought to develop Thai nationalism far beyond what the monarchy 
had promulgated in previous years. 
 
Phibun and the military government believed that “Thai-ness” was necessary for a unified Thai state, which was 
vital to national security.72 He and his government enacted a series of decrees in 1939 (rattaniyom) designed to 
define Thai-ness. The first was to change the name of the country from Siam to Thailand in order to better reflect 
the “Thai” nature of inhabitants of the state. Later decrees did away with prefixes that described regional origin 
and identified ethnic differences (for example, Northern Thai). The ninth, which dealt specifically with 
language policy, declared that “Thais must recognize that one of the civic duties of a good Thai citizen is to study 
Thai which is the national language.”73 These decrees were followed by Culture Acts to provide them with legal 
force.74 At the same time, further efforts were taken to restrict the use of foreign languages. This was especially 
true for Chinese. Chinese schools were limited to two hours of Chinese language per week, and all but one of the 
Chinese language newspapers were closed.75 
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Phibun’s government actively promoted and developed the hegemony of standard Thai throughout the country. 
The government even briefly tried to establish a set of new grammar rules. Although not all his language reforms 
were successful, by the time Phibun left office in 1944,76 “the establishment of Thai as the national language 
would never again be questioned.”77 
 
In both time periods considered here, one might argue that the language policy which emerged was merely part of 
the process of state-building. But if that is the case, why was a “dialect” spoken by only about 15 percent of the 
population chosen as the primary language of the state when approximately one-third of population spoke Lao 
rather than Thai?78 We argue that this outcome is explained by the fact that the ruling political coalition faced no 
serious threat from alternate linguistic groups. The alternate linguistic groups’ capacity to protest en masse was 
suspect; what protests did occur were brutally suppressed by superior military strength. By contrast, the Thai 
political elites were unified in their decision to designate standard Thai as the sole language of government 
services and of the education curriculum. Alternate linguistic groups were effectively unable to threaten the state. 
As predicted, under such conditions, we would expect a move toward monolingualism in the first observation and 
no shift in policies in the second. The evidence indicates this was the case. 
 
 
Conclusion 
We have argued that language policy choices are the product of constraints facing the government during critical 
junctures in history. During times of political change in the state-building process, if the effective threat of 
alternate linguistic groups is low, the government can afford to shift language policies toward greater degrees of 
monolingualism. In contrast, if the effective threat is high, the government is constrained. This constraint forces 
the government to co-opt the alternate linguistic group with policy concessions. The result of this cooptation 
is multilingualism. 
 
Theoretically, the coalitional constraint explanation improves on three extant explanations in the literature. The 
first argues language policies are symptoms of ethnic relations. Monolingualism emerges when one group can 
impose its dominance over another. This need to assert group dominance is the result of primordial hatred. 
Because this explanation assumes the non-malleability of ethnic identity, it treats ethnic relations—and the effects 
(that is, language policies)—as static. Yet as we have seen cross-nationally across the three countries (Singapore, 
Malaysia, and Thailand) and over time in each of the three, language policies are dynamic. The second 
explanation focuses on the effects of colonialism. Undoubtedly colonial legacies mattered, whether it was because 
of path dependence or because it created a focal point for the need to substitute. But this explanation cannot 
account for which of the two mechanisms matters. Moreover, since colonial legacy is static, it—like the ethnic 
hatred explanation—cannot account for the dynamic changes in language policies. The third and final explanation 
emphasizes nation-building. Language policies are instruments for nation-building. But these accounts take 
language policies as given. Explanations are often ex post or functional in character. Additionally, this 
explanation cannot account for why governments adopt different strategies for nation-building. Our approach 
moves beyond a static view of language policies and provides a novel description of the conditions that can force 
a government to choose between monolingual and multilingual policies. Such choices hinge on coalitional 
constraints. 
 
By focusing on the effective threat of the alternate linguistic group as a shared antecedent condition for language 
policy choices, we present an argument that is more deterministic than probabilistic. Our motivation to do so was 
twofold. The first is to encourage generalization. There is no reason to believe our argument is confined to only 
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these three countries specifically or to Southeast Asia more broadly. For instance, Bhavna Dave’s work on 
language policies in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan highlights the role of state capacity.79 Similarly, Sener Aktürk’s 
comparative analysis of ethnic regimes in Germany, Russia, and Turkey points to the interaction between 
counterelites, discourse, and hegemonic majority.80 Our theory is portable and can be readily applied to these 
cases and others. The second, related, is to facilitate empirical testing. If future research uncovers evidence of a 
case where an alternate linguistic group was of high effective threat but no multilingual policy emerged, our 
argument can be considered falsified.  
 
Charles Tilly’s declaration that “war made the state, and the state made war”81 generated a body of scholarship 
that looked at the effects of security threats and revenue demands on state-building. But language is just as 
important—if not more so. It is not only a vehicle of communication. It is a currency. Like monies and centralized 
weights, languages standardize and facilitate transactions.82 Without this standardization, no government can 
successfully launch a military campaign or effectively collect revenues from its citizens. Put differently, without a 
language policy, neither military nor financial control can exist. And in the absence of either, there is no state.83 
We call attention to the fact that an understanding of political coalitions is essential to determining the causes of 
language policy. 
 
 
 
References 
Abdul Samad, Paridah. 1998. Tun Abdul Razak. Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: Affluent Master Sendirian Berhad. 
Acemoglu, Daron, and James Robinson. 2005. Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. New York, 
N.Y.: Cambridge University Press. 
Aktürk, Sener. 2011. “Regimes of Ethnicity: Comparative Analysis of Germany, the Soviet Union/Post-Soviet 
Russia, and Turkey.” World Politics 63, no. 1: 115–64. 
Alesina, Alberto, Arnaud Devleeschauwer, William Easterly, Sergio Kurlat, and Romain Wacziarg. 2003. 
“Fractionalization.” Journal of Economic Growth 8: 155–94. 
Anderson, Benedict. 1983. Imagined Communities. London, UK: Verso. 
Boix, Carles. 2003. Democracy and Redistribution. New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press. 
Brown, David. 2009. “Ethnic and Nationalist Politics in Southeast Asia.” In Mark Beeson, ed., Contemporary 
Southeast Asia. Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Brown, David S., and Amy H. Liu. 2011. “Democracy and Minority Language Recognition.” Manuscript, 
University of Colorado at Boulder. 
Brown, Michael E., and Šumit Ganguly. 2003. “Introduction.” In Michael E. Brown and Šumit Ganguly, eds., 
Fighting Words. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alastair Smith. 2003. The Logic of 
Political Survival. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
Burhanudeen, Hafriza. 2006. “Language and Social Behavior.” Ph.D. diss., Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia. 
                                                          
79 Dave 2004. 
80 Aktürk 2011. 
81 Tilly 1975. 
82 Laitin 1988; Scott 1998. 
83 Ertman 1997; Tilly 1992 
 19 
 
 
Campos, José Edgardo L., and Hilton L. Root. 1996. The Key to the Asian Miracle. Washington, D.C.: Brookings 
Institution Press. 
Chan, Heng Chee, and Obaid ul Haq, eds. 1987. The Prophetic and the Political. Singapore: Graham Brash 
Private Limited. 
Collier, David, Jason Seawright, and Gerardo Munck. 2004. “The Quest for Standards: King, Keohane, and 
Verba’s Designing Social Inquiry.” In Henry Brady and David Collier, eds., Rethinking Social Inquiry. 
Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield. 
Collier, Ruth Berins, and David Collier. 1991. Shaping the Political Arena. Notre Dame, Ind.: Notre Dame 
University Press. 
Dave, Bhavna. 2004. “A Shrinking Reach of the State? Language Policy and Implementation in Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan.” In Pauline Jones Luong, ed., The Transformation of Central Asia. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell 
University Press. 
Diller, Anthony. 2002. “What Makes Central Thai a National Language?” In Craig Reynolds, ed., National 
Identity and Its Defenders: Thailand Today. Chiang Mai, Thailand: Silkworm Books. 
Doner, Richard F., Bryan K. Ritchie, and Dan Slater. 2005. “Systemic Vulnerability and the Origins of 
Developmental States.” International Organization 59, no. 2: 327–61. 
Ertman, Thomas. 1997. Birth of the Leviathan. New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press. 
Fishman, Joshua A. 1989. Language and Ethnicity in Minority Sociolinguistic Perspective. Clevedon, UK: 
Multilingual Matters. 
Fong, Sip Chee. 1979. The PAP Story. Singapore: Times Periodicals Private Limited. 
Gandhi, Jennifer. 2008. Political Institutions under Dictatorship. New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press. 
Ganguly, Rajat. 2003. “Introduction.” In Rajat Ganguly and Ian Macduff, eds., Ethnic Conflict and Secessionism 
in South and Southeast Asia. New Delhi, India: Sage Publications. 
Ganguly, Šumit. 2003. “The Politics of Language Policies in Malaysia and Singapore.” In Michael E. Brown and 
Šumit Ganguly, eds., Fighting Words. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
Geertz, Clifford. 1994. “Primordial and Civic Ties.” In John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, eds., 
Nationalism. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.  
Gellner, Ernest. 1983. Nations and Nationalism. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. 
George, Alexander L., and Andrew Bennett. 2005. Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences. 
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
Gopinathan, S. 1974. Towards a National System of Education in Singapore 1945–1973. Singapore: Oxford 
University Press. 
Grabowsky, Volker. 1995. “The Isan Up to Its Integration into the Siamese State.” In Volker Grabowsky, ed., 
Regions and National Integration in Thailand, 1892–1992. Wiesbaden, Germany: Harrassowitz Verlag. 
Grimes, Barbara, ed. 1978. Ethnologue, 9th ed. Huntington Beach, Calif.: Wycliffe Bible Translators, Inc. 
———. 1984. Ethnologue, 10th ed. Dallas, Tex.: Wycliffe Bible Translators, Inc. 
Hirschman, Charles. 1987. “The Meaning and Measurement of Ethnicity in Malaysia.” Journal of Asian Studies 
46, no. 3: 555–82. 
Hobsbawm, Eric. 1990. Nations and Nationalism since 1780. New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press. 
 20 
 
 
Kaplan, Robert B., and Richard B. Baldauf, Jr. 2003. Language and Language-in-Education Planning in the 
Pacific Basin. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Keyes, Charles F. 1997. “Cultural Diversity and National Identity in Thailand.” In Michael E. Brown and Šumit 
Ganguly, eds., Government Policies and Ethnic Relations in Asia and the Pacific. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 
Press. 
———. 2003. “The Politics of Language in Thailand and Laos.” In Michael E. Brown and Šumit Ganguly, eds., 
Fighting Words. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.  
Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian. 1995. Thailand’s Durable Premier: Phibun through Three Decades 1932–1957. 
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: Oxford University Press. 
Laitin, David D. 1988. “Language Games.” Comparative Politics 20, no. 3: 289–302. 
———. 1998. Identity in Formation. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. Leclerc, Jacques 2011. 
L’aménagement linguistique dans le monde. At http://www.tlfq.ulaval.ca/axl/. 
Lee Hock Guan. 2007. “Ethnic Politics, National Development and Language Policy in Malaysia.” In Lee Hock 
Guan and Leo Suryadinata, eds., Language, Nation and Development in Southeast Asia. Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies. 
Lee Kuan Yew. 1998. The Singapore Story. Singapore: Prentice Hall.  
———. 2000. From Third World to First. Singapore: Times Media Private Limited. 
Lewis, Paul M., ed. 2009. Ethnologue, 16th ed. Dallas, Tex.: SIL International. 
MacIntyre, Andrew. 2001. “Institutions and Investors.” International Organization 55, no. 1:81–122. 
Mahoney, James. 2000. “Path Dependence in Historical Sociology.” Theory and Society 29, no. 4: 507–48. 
Means, Gordon P. 1991. Malaysian Politics. Singapore: Oxford University Press. 
Migdal, Joel S. 2001. State in Society. New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press. 
Mohr, Marie V. 1984. The Call of the Hibiscus. Singapore: Gunung Agung Pte Ltd. 
Montolalu, Lucy R., and Leo Suryadinata. 2007. “National Language and Nation-Building.” In Lee Hock Guan 
and Leo Suryadinata, eds., Language, Nation and Development in Southeast Asia. Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies. 
Osborne, Milton. 1997. Southeast Asia. St. Leonards, NSW: Allen and Unwin Limited. 
Paitoon Mikusol. 1995. “Administrative Reforms and National Integration.” In Volker Grabowsky, ed., Regions 
and National Integration in Thailand, 1892–1992. Wiesbaden, Germany: Harrassowitz Verlag. 
Pepinsky, Thomas. 2009. Economic Crises and the Breakdown of Authoritarian Regimes. New York, N.Y.: 
Cambridge University Press. 
PuruShotam, Nirmala. 1998. “Disciplining Difference.” In Joel S. Kahn, ed., Southeast Asian Identities. New 
York, N.Y.: St. Martin’s Press. 
Ragin, Charles C. 2008. Redesigning Social Inquiry: Fuzzy Sets and Beyond. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago 
Press. 
Rahman Putra, Abdul. 1978. Viewpoints. Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: Heinemann Educational Books Limited. 
Rappa, Antonio, and Lionel Wee. 2006. Language Policy and Modernity in Southeast Asia. New York, N.Y.: 
Springer. 
Reynolds, Craig. 2002. “Introduction.” In Craig Reynolds, ed., National Identity and Its Defenders: Thailand 
Today. Chiang Mai, Thailand: Silkworm Books. 
 21 
 
 
Scott, James. 1998. Seeing like a State. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. 
Simpson, Andrew, ed. 2007. Language and National Identity in Asia. New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press. 
Shaw, William. 1976. Tun Razak. Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: Longman Malaysia Sendirian Berhad. 
Skinner, G. Williams. 1958. “The Chinese of Java.” In Morton H. Fried, ed., Colloquium on Overseas Chinese. 
New York, N.Y.: Institute of Pacific Relations. 
———. 1963. “The Chinese Minority.” In Ruth T. McVey, ed., Indonesia. New Haven, Conn.: HRAF Press. 
Smalley, William A. 1994. Linguistic Diversity and National Unity. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press. 
Smith, Anthony D. 2000. The Nation in History. Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England. 
Somchai Phatharathananunth. 2002. “Political Resistance in Isan.” Tai Culture 7, no. 1: 106–32. 
Sunday Times. 1959a. “Translating Done Free during L-Week.” March 25. 
———. 1959b. “Institute of Malayan Culture.” August 23. 
Tan, Eugene K. B. 2007. “The Multilingual State in Search of the Nation.” In Lee Hock Guan and Leo 
Suryadinata, eds., Language, Nation and Development in Southeast Asia. Singapore: Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies. 
Tan, Siok Sun. 2007. Goh Keng Swee. Singapore: Editions Didier Millet. 
Tarling, Nicholas. 2004. Nationalism in Southeast Asia. London, UK: Routledge Curzon. 
Thak Chaloemtiarana, ed. 1978. Thai Politics. Bangkok, Thailand: Social Science Association of Thailand. 
Tilly, Charles. 1975. “Reflections on the History of European State-Making.” In Charles Tilly and Gabriel 
Ardant, eds., The Formation of National States in Western Europe. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
———. 1992. Coercion, Capital, and European States AD 990-1992. Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell Publishing. 
Tocqueville, Alexis de. [1835] 2002. Democracy in America. Trans. Harvey C.  
Mansfield and Delba Winthrop. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press. 
Tongchai, Winichakul. 1994. Siam Mapped. Honolulu, Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press. 
Vella, Walter F. 1978. Chaiyo! King Vajiravudh and the Development of Thai Nationalism. Honolulu, Hawaii: 
University of Hawaii Press. 
Vickery, Michael. 1970. “Thai Regional Elites and the Reforms of King Chulalongkorn.” Journal of Asian 
Studies 29, no. 4: 863–81. 
Waldner, David. 1999. State Building and Late Development. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. 
Wintrobe, Ronald. 1998. The Political Economy of Dictatorship. New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press. 
Wyatt, David. 1969. The Politics of Reform in Thailand. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. 
———. 2003. Thailand, 2nd ed. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. 
